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Abstract
This paper investigates the performance of absorption versus direct costing proce-
dures. The setting for our analysis is a product admittance problem that takes place
in a stochastic and dynamic production system. We consider the extent to which ab-
sorption costing based accounting calculations provide good proxies for hard to observe
opportunity costs. We show that the existence of opportunity costs cannot always be
used as a defense of absorption costing. In order to guide the comparative ranking
of costing procedures, we show the existence of an "open admittance" condition on
the parameters of the problem that ensures that absorption costing always out per-
forms direct costing. We conclude by discussing the implications our theory has for
the empirical analysis of the absorption costing versus direct costing debate.
^Principal correspondent: Professor George E. Monahan, Department of Business Administration, Uni-
versity of Illinois, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820

1 Introduction
In this research, we focus on the enduring question of whether to base operating decisions
made in an uncertain environment on either absorption or direct costing procedures. Zim-
merman (1979) has proposed that "... cost allocation can act as a lump-sum tax which
reduces the manager's consumption of perquisites and that cost allocations can serve as
useful proxy variables for certain difficult to observe costs." In effect, he argues that cost
allocation can perform the dual role of alleviating both agency cost problems and problems
associated with the determination of opportunity costs. In this paper, we systematically
investigate the extent to which one can defend absorption costing (cost allocation) on the
basis that it is a good proxy for opportunity costs.
Our analysis takes place within the context of a simple manufacturing environment. Two
products, endowed with differential contribution margins, but identical processing require-
ments, are produced in a manufacturing facility with limited capacity. Orders for the prod-
ucts arrive randomly over time and, upon their arrival, may be either accepted or rejected.
Processing times of accepted orders are random.
All jobs waiting for processing incur a holding cost per unit time during the time they
remain in the facility. The decision problem is to determine whether an arriving order should
be accepted or rejected so that the total expected net profit (contribution margin less holding
cost) generated over a prescribed length of time is maximized.
The problem is complicated by the fact that the number of jobs in the system fluctuates
randomly over time so that the holding cost generated by an admitted order is difficult to
measure. Furthermore, the acceptance of orders for the product with the low-contribution
margin reduces the processing capacity available for any high-contribution margin orders
that may arrive in the future. The opportunity costs associated with the admittance of
low-revenue orders are also difficult to measure—they depend upon the status of the facility,
a characteristic that changes randomly over time.
From a practical point-of-view, how would a cost accounting system determine which
orders should be admitted? The answer to this question centers on the measurement of
relevant costs. In practice, two heuristic rules are commonly employed to control the admit-
tance to stochastic service systems such as the one we analyze here. (See Dickhaut and Lere
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(1983) for a discussion of heuristics involving absorption costing used in practice.) These
"rules-of-thumb" are motivated by ideas grounded in prescriptions for dealing with fixed
costs, capacity, and congestion in cost accounting systems. The direct costing (DC) rule
admits any order whose contribution margin exceeds the expected holding cost associated
with the order if it is admitted. This rule views the cost of providing the productive capacity
as sunk, and thus ignores it. Furthermore, this rule ignores the opportunity cost generated
by the admittance of an order.
The second rule-of-thumb observed in practice seeks to account for opportunity costs
generated by an order that is admitted to the facility. It does this by allocating to all
admitted orders some portion of the fixed cost of providing the capacity of the facility. The
absorption (or full) costing (AC) rule admits an order if its contribution margin exceeds the
sum of its expected holding cost and the allocated cost of providing the productive capacity.
Is one of these rules universally better? If not, under what conditions will one be better
than the other? In principle, we know there is an optimal admittance rule that correctly
balances contribution margins and total economic costs. The DC rule can only under-
estimate the relevant costs associated with an order and hence can only over-admit relative
to an optimal admittance policy. If allocated costs are sufficiently large, the AC rule may
over-estimate opportunity costs and, as a result, under-admit relative to the optimal rule.
Unlike the DC rule, the AC rule can both under- and over-admit. A priori, it is not clear
which rule is better—is it better to both under- and over-admit a little or to not under-admit
at all but over-admit a great deal? Are there conditions under which we would expect the
absorption costing rule to generate higher expected rewards than the direct costing rule?
To address these and other questions regarding the measurement of relevant economic
costs in a stochastic setting, we formulate the problem of determining which orders should
be admitted to the production facility as a Markov decision process (MDP) in which we
maximize expected total contribution less holding cost generated over a given length of time.
The MDP is an optimization procedure that will yield as its solution an optimal admittance
policy that prescribes whether or not an arriving order should be admitted based upon the
current number of jobs that are already in the facility and the length of time that remains in
the planning horizon. When a new order arrives at the facility, the MDP implicitly compares
the contribution margin that the order will generate upon the completion of its processing
with the expected total cost that the order will incur while it is in the system. This cost is
the sum of the (direct) holding cost generated by the order plus the actual opportunity cost
that that order will impose on the system.
The focus of this paper is not on the use of MDP's to optimally control the admittance
of orders to a production facility. Rather our interest centers on what the MDP allows
us to say regarding the efhcacy of cost accounting based admittance rules in a stochastic
operating environment. A principle contribution of this paper is the derivation of conditions
on the observable parameters of the problem that ensure that product acceptance rules that
are based on absorption costs always dominate direct costing based rules. In particular,
we show that if allocated costs are not "too high", we can unambiguously declare that
absorption costing results in higher expected profits than direct costing for all possible in-
process inventory levels. Furthermore, we explicitly define the notion of "high" allocated
costs in terms of the parameters of the problem. We therefore provide greater rigor to the
traditional defenses of cost allocation.
Banker, Datar, and Kekre (1988, hereafter BDK) contribute to our understanding of the
nature of relevant (opportunity) costs by showing why it is important to include inventory
carrying costs (holding costs) in cost analysis. However, they are primarily concerned with
issues regarding the design specification of a manufacturing system in which the decision
whether to accept a new product or provide investment in plant to reduce setup time is
made once, at the beginning of a planning period. For the product admittance problem
that we consider, the design specification is set. We are concerned with the determination
of operational (micro-level) admittance rules that control the operation of the facility over
time.
Similarly, Miller and Buckman (1987) consider issues regarding the design specification
of a stochastic production system that includes the choice of arrival and service rates. Their
research strategy of relating allocated fixed costs to the optimal opportunity costs arising in
a queueing system model of the production process is commensurate with ours. However,
as with BDK, their focus is on design specification issues. In particular, they are concerned
with the determination of the type of production facility that will be employed and not on
the operation of a facility once it has been specified.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of opportunity costs
and related literature. We argue that an expansive view of opportunity cost issues that
arise in managerial decision making processes takes place within a stochastic, dynamic op-
erating environment. In such an environment, actual opportunity costs depend upon the
ever-changing status of the system. An MDP model of the product admittance problem is
formulated in Section 3. We use this model to identify optimal product admittance rules that
into account the actual opportunity costs associated with operating in a congested stochastic
production system. A numerical example is used to illustrate just how complex the optimal
opportunity cost measures may become. In Section 4, we consider the product acceptance
rules derived from the conventional cost accounting techniques of direct costing and absorp-
tion costing. Here we derive an expression that is a lower bound on the expected holding
cost that an order incurs if it admitted to the system. A numerical example illustrates how
these rules compare to the optimal admittance policy and show that in general, one rule
does not always dominate for all possible values of the parameters of the problem.
To this point, therefore, we are left with no clear guidelines of which costing procedure
to support. In Section 5, we overcome this problem by developing an "open admittance"
condition on the parameters of the problem that allow us to unambiguously recommend the
adoption of absorption costing rather than direct costing procedures. We present a clear
intuition for our results and discuss how the condition could be useful in practice. We then
briefly discuss empirical implications of the open admittance condition. Concluding remarks
are contained in Section 6.
2 The Nature and Measurement of Opportunity Costs
More than forty years ago, Devine (1950, pp. 389) raised the issue of the need for cost
accountants to explicitly consider the nature and significance of congestion costs resulting
from operational capacity constraints. He recounts how ". . . businessmen . . . have . . . favored
the cost accountant's total unit cost . . ." concept, now often referred to as absorption costing,
in which an allocated share of sunk costs is charged against products when making order
acceptance decisions. He defends this practice by arguing that, if "... a firm is operating at
full capacity . .
., the usual approach that utilizes the contribution of the selling price over
variable costs must be modified drastically before it can be applied with benefit." He supports
absorption costing practices on the grounds that ". . . the distribution of fixed overhead to
jobs or products is normally on a time basis, and the relative total fixed overhead charges
to jobs do therefore measure more or less imperfectly the relative usage of the firm's scarce
factor of production."
Two observations flow naturally from these statements. First, direct costing procedures
are seen as imperfect, in the sense that no incorporation of opportunity costs arising from
capacity (congestion) constraints are incorporated. Second, he does not present an unequiv-
ocal recommendation for the use of absorption costing. This arises because his defense of
absorption costing depends on whether or not a firm is operating at full capacity. Devine's
rationale for absorption costing does not apply to a firm operating consistently below ca-
pacity, as is often recommended by manufacturing ideologies such as just-in-time. It is as if
a firm needs to have a bell that rings when capacity is reached and then, instantaneously,
switches from direct costing to absorption costing. This latter remark is not intended in any
way to trivialize Devine's argument, but instead is used to motivate a critical consideration
of his implicit model of the production environment. Our fundamental criticism of Devine's
rationale centers on the concept of opportunity (congestion) cost that he uses. Implicit in
Devine's discussion of opportunity cost is the belief that it is sufficient to characterize the
production environment as deterministic and static. In such an environment, a ". . . specific
resource is not considered to be scarce . . . unless it is optimal to exhaust the capacity of the
resource completely" (Knudsen 1972, pg. 526). The result is a "bang-bang" notion of oppor-
tunity cost (shadow pricing) in which opportunity costs are characterized by fundamental
discontinuities that jump from zero to non-zero values when full capacity is reached.
If we are to develop an expansive theory of absorption costing that is based upon the need
to incorporate opportunity costs, we must do so in a production environment wherein oppor-
tunity costs depend on any operating load of the system, not just a load that corresponds
to full capacity. Given this specific intent, it is therefore natural to consider the produc-
tion environment as a stochastic process. We specify order arrival rates and manufacturing
processing rates so that the expected proportion of capacity usage is less than 100%. Even
though there is less than 100% utilization of the facilities, opportunity costs are relevant. At
any point in time, there is a positive probability that the facility is operating at full capacity
in the sense that the job currently being processed or the jobs that are awaiting processing
may not be completed within a prescribed length of time. Furthermore, the decision whether
or not to admit a product to the production facility will positively affect the opportunity
cost of future product orders. Neither of these effects can arise in a deterministic and static
production setting. (See Knudsen (1972) and BDK for more details.)
The problem of deciding which products to admit to a congested production system is a
special case of the general problem of optimally controlling the admission of customers to a
(congested) queueing system. In the following section, we develop a queueing-control model
that specifies optimal expected profits in terms of the number of jobs in the facility. We then
present a numerical example to demonstrate the application of the model; this example also
illustrates a number of desirable features of the model.
We have thus achieved our initial goal of establishing a model of the production environ-
ment in which decisions regarding product admittance give rise to a more profound notion of
(mutable) opportunity cost. Moreover, our analytical development of the optimality equa-
tions of the MDP allow us to discuss in an unambiguous fashion the exact measurement of
opportunity cost. This arises because the use of the optimal control procedure for admission
to a queue is equivalent to charging an optimal toll for entrants to a congested system. This
equivalence was first informally proposed by Leeman (1964, 1965) and Saaty (1965), and
was addressed analytically in Naor (1969). Using our MDP formulation, we know that the
optimal toll for the queue admittance control problem represents the opportunity cost that
we wish to identify. (See Lippman and Stidham (1977) for a related discussion of optimal
tolls in congested queueing systems.)
As our numerical example makes clear, the complex nature of implied opportunity cost
makes it is extremely difficult to compute, and therefore to use, in practice. Clearly this
measurability issue must be addressed in order for us to be able to develop costing procedures
that are readily implementable. With Zimmerman's initial assertion in mind, we consider
the extent to which absorption costing procedures proxy opportunity costs that have been
identified by the optimal control formulation.
3 Optimal Admittance Rules
We now develop a queueing theory model of the production process in which we identify the
actual opportunity cost of acceptance of arriving product orders. For simplicity, we model
the manufacturing facility as an M/M/l/I+J-l-1 queueing system (i.e., Possion arrivals,
exponential service times, one server, and a system capacity of / + J + 1 jobs) with two
customer classes (product types). The single-server assumption allows us to concentrate on
a congested production facility that processes one job at a time. Arrivals (product orders)
occur at a rate of A > per unit time so that times between arrivals are exponential
random variables with mean 1/A. Each arrival belongs to either the high-revenue class with
probability p or the low-revenue class with probability 1 — p. High (low) revenue jobs have
a contribution margin of ri (tq with r^ > tq) upon completion; these margins are per unit
and net of unit variable cost. For expositional purposes, we refer to jobs whose contribution
margins are r^ and tq as high and low revenue jobs, respectively.
The server operates at a rate of fi jobs per unit time, where // > A. Under the M/M/1
assumption, processing times are exponential random variables with mean l//x. BDK ex-
plain in detail why it is necessary to include the "incremental carrying or holding costs of
inventories from longer queues" in cost analyses. In order to ensure that it will not be desir-
able to always admit every order if there is room, we assume that when an order is admitted
to the system, it incurs a holding cost of $1 per unit time during the entire time the job is
in the facility. At each arrival epoch, the firm observes the type (contribution) of the order
and may either accept or reject that order based upon the number of orders of each type
that are currently in the system. When an order is accepted it is referred to as a job.
In our production environment, opportunity costs are generated whenever a low-revenue
product is accepted. Some of the finite capacity of the manufacturing facility is used up
to process the low-revenue jobs, leaving less capacity to process high-revenue jobs that may
arrive later. The decision-maker is thus faced with the problem of deciding whether or not
to accept the low-revenue job. If a low-revenue job is accepted, there may not be enough
time in the budget period to process a high-revenue order that may become available in the
future. If a low-revenue job is not accepted, there is positive probability that there will be
no high-revenue orders in the future.
Before we formally describe the operating environment by defining the states of the
decision process, we need to specify how the budget period and queue disciplines are set.
The queue discipline we employ is a modified FIFO scheme. Within each of the two job
classes, jobs are processed on a first-in-first-out basis. However, the choice of the job class to
process next is stochastic. Upon a service completion, the server selects a high-revenue job
from the queue of accepted high-revenue jobs with probability 7(^, j) and from the queue of
low-revenue jobs with probability 1 — '){i,j) when there are i and j high and low-revenue
jobs in the queue, respectively. We assume that the scheduling rule ^{i,j) has the following
simple form:
{/?
if i > 0, i >
1 if z>0, ;=0
if 1 = 0, j >0
for < f3 < I. Thus, if there are both types of jobs waiting to be processed, is the
probability that a high-revenue job is selected.
We assume that the decision process proceeds for T units of time, an exogenous variable
that we refer to as the budget period. This corresponds to the length of time the server is
left to operate without re-evaluating its capacity. Thus, it is natural to view the budget
period as the length of time between periodic evaluation of the design considerations that
arise in Miller and Buckman and BDK. In queueing control models, decisions can be made
only at arrival or service completion epochs. The number of "decision periods", therefore,
corresponds to the number of arrivals (orders) and departures (service completions) that
occur during T units of time. In our model, the time until either the next arrival or the next
departure is an exponential random variable whose mean is 1/(A
-f- fi). Let N{\,fj.) denote
the expected number of decision periods that constitute a single budget period. Thus,
N{\,fi) = (A -|- fi)T. Without loss of generality, we scale time so that T = I and will, for
simplicity, refer to N{X,fi) as the budget period. We assume that the revenue associated
with any job that has been accepted but not processed completely before the end of the
budget period is foregone.
We develop our formulation of the operating environment via the following state space
characterization. Transitions between states of the decision process occur as the result of the
arrival of an order or the completion of the processing of a job. If the transition is due to an
arriving order, let (z, j, r^, Va) denote the state, where i and j are the number of high-revenue
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and low-revenue orders, respectively, that are already in the queue. In addition, r^ and r^
are the revenues associated with the job currently in service and with the arriving order,
respectively. If the transition is due to a service completion, the state is denoted simply as
(z,j, r^), where r^ is the revenue of the new job just selected for service and i + j are the
number of remaining jobs waiting for service in the queue.
We assume that there is limited storage area for both types of jobs. In particular, there
can be no more than / and J high-revenue and low-revenue jobs, respectively, in the queue
at any time.
3.1 A Continuous-Time MDP
We now develop notation that is used to define a model that will yield optimal admittance
policies. The model compares the net benefits of not admitting a product that arrives with
the benefits of admittance. Let Va be the contribution margin of an arriving order and
Vg denote the contribution margin from the order that is currently in service; if no job is
currently in service, r^ = 0. The desirability of admittance also depends on the congestion
in the system, which is determined by the current values of i, j, and r^. To determine the
net benefits from admitting an arriving order, let Vt(i,i, r^, r^) denote the optimal expected
discounted total profit generated from the beginning of period t through the end of the
budget period, where t = I, . .
.
, N{\, fi) when the state at the beginning of period t is
(^i, ^5,^a)- Let Ut{i,j,rs) denote the optimal total expected discounted profits earned from
period t onward when the state is (z,^, r,). Let
Ar,) =
{ ;
fi if Ts >
otherwise
denote the service rate as a function of r^, the revenue of the job in service. We assume that
the total holding cost rate per unit time incurred by the system when there are i {j) high-
(low-) revenue jobs in the queue and is of the form:
^^''•^'"^^^
\ otherwise.
^^'
We present the uniformized version of a continuous-time Markov decision chain, in which
the distribution of holding times in each state is independent of the action taken in that
state. Let A = A 4- // denote the parameter of the exponential time that the process spends
in any state. Using this notation, the budget period is A^(A,/x) = A. Let a > denote the
continuous discounting rate, so that the present value of $x received r time units from now
is xe-'*^
3.2 The Optimality Equations
The Vti'i •, •, •) and Ut{-, •, •) functions satisfy the following dynamic programming equations:
If r, > 0,
VtiiJ^r.^ri) = ma.x{Ut{i + l,j,r,) - Ut{ij,r,),0} + Ut{iJ,r,) (2)
for < 2 < / — 1 and j < J and
Vt(i,i,r,,ro) = max{f/((z,j + I.Ts) - Ut{ij,rs),0} + Ut{iJ,rs) (3)
for < j < J - 1, 2 < /, and 1 < ^ < iV(/x), where
Ut{i,j,rs) = {-h{i,j,r,)-\-\[pVt+i{i,j,rs,ri)-\-{l - p)Vt+i{i,j,rs,ro)]
+/i(r5)[r, + 7(^i)t^t+l(^-l,i,^l) (4)
+[l-7(^,j)]t/m(^,J-l,ro)]}/(a + A),
if 2 + i > 0.
Also
for all j and
for all i, since a new job cannot be admitted if the input buffer is full for that job type.
If Vs = 0, then i -\- j = and
K(0,0,0,rj = max{t/,(0,0,r,) - 6/^(0,0, 0), 0} + /7,(0,0,0) (5)
for all Ta. Also, Ut{-1, •, •) = Uti-, -1, •) = for all t, ^n(a,m)+i(^ •. = 0. and
Ut{0,0,r,) = {-/i(0,0,r,) + A[pV;+i(0,0,r3,ri)
+(l-p)K+i(0,0,r„ro)] (6)
+//h + 6/,|i(0,0,0)]}/(a + A)
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for Tg > and
Ut{0,0,0) = {A[pK+i(0,0,0,ri) + (l-p)K+i(0,0,0,ro)] (7)
+/.(7,+i(0,0,0)]}/(a + A)
for 1 < i < N{fi).
We begin the interpretation of these equations with (4). The first term { — h{i,j,rs)/{a +
A)) represents the discounted total expected holding cost generated during the exponential
amount of time the system is in state (i, j, Tj). If the period ends as the result of an arrival,
which occurs with probability A/A, the new arrival is a high- (low-) revenue order with
probability p ([1 —p]). The maximum expected total discounted profit that can be generated
from period ^-|-1 through period N{X,fi) is Vt+i{i,j,rs,ra)^ where Va is the revenue associated
with the arrival. The term in (4) that is multiplied by A is the maximum total expected
profit that can be generated if period t ends as the result of an arrival and the decision
process continues optimally. Similarly, the term that is multiplied by //(r^) is the maximum
expected total discounted profit that can be earned from period ^ + 1 onward if period t
terminates as a result of a service completion. The revenue r^ associated with the job in
service during period t is received, the state of the decision process moves from (i, j,rs) to
either {i — 1, j,ri) or {i,j — l,ro) with probability '){i,j) and 1 — 'y{i,j), respectively.
The expression in (2) quantifies the options that are available when a high-revenue order
is being considered for admittance. If the order is admitted, it joins the high-revenue job
queue, which increases in length from i to i + I. If the order is declined, the high-revenue
job queue remains at its current length of i. In either case, the decision process continues in
an optimal manner.
The expression for K(0,0,0,ra) in (5) reflects our assumption that an order that is
admitted to an empty system begins processing immediately.
Finally, the expression for f7((0, 0,0) in (7) indicates what can happen when the facility
is empty: there may an arrival of an order (either high or low revenue) or there may be a
"fictitious" service completion — the job currently in service remains in service for another
time period. The latter event is part of the uniformization process; see, e.g., Lippman (1975).
We now present a numerical example that illustrates the opportunity costs generated by
accepting low-revenue orders.
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3.3 Numerical Example
From the dynamic programming optimality equations, we know that the optimal expected
payoff when considering the acceptance of a low-revenue order is given by the expression in
(3): a low-revenue job should be admitted if, and only if, the optimal expected discounted
total profit that can be earned over the remainder of the budget period is greater in state
{i,j + l,rs) than it is in state (2,7, Tj). A particularly desirable feature of this formulation
is that Un{i-,j + 1,^3) — Unii-ijifa) is the explicit measure for the opportunity cost, since it
measures the net impact of admitting one more low-revenue order to the production system.
Whenever the opportunity cost associated with the acceptance of a low-revenue order is
negative, it is not optimal to admit that order. To illustrate this point, we use the MDP
to determine the numerical values of the opportunity cost that depend on the state of the
system for the set of parameter values in Table 1.
Place Table 1 here.
The optimal expected profit and opportunity cost for several states are given in Table 2
when there are no high-revenue jobs in the queue but there is a high-revenue job in service
in the first period of a problem whose budget period consists of 41 periods.
Place Table 2 here.
From the information in Table 2, we see that it is optimal to admit at most four low-
revenue jobs to this system when there are no high-revenue jobs in the queue and there is a
high-revenue job at the server. We describe this optimal admittance policy as a
"Jividp = ^
policy", remembering that the critical number of jobs depends on the specific values oit, i,
and Tj. For i = and r, = 0.3, the complete i^DP policy for all periods is given in Table 3.
Place Table 3 here.
For realistic production settings, the computational complexity of the MDP is consider-
able, since the z, j, and r^ values vary from period to period. Therefore, in the next section,
we consider two heuristic costing rules often used in practice to determine admittance poli-
cies. Given our identification of optimal policies in this section, we can now be unambiguous
in our appraisal of these (possibly) non-optimal procedures.
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4 Direct and Absorption Costing Based Admittance
Rules
In this section, we explicitly develop admittance rules based upon direct and absorption
costing assumptions. As explained in BDK, costing procedures developed to operate in con-
gested and stochastic production environments need to include holding cost in the analysis.
The continuous-time MDP of the previous section did so optimally, by explicitly incorporat-
ing holding costs within the dynamic programming formulation (see equations (4) and (6)).
Thus, the direct and absorption costing procedures must also consider holding costs. We
cannot, however, use the identical holding costs implicitly used by the MDP. The rationale
for considering heuristic cost accounting procedures was that the optimal analysis could not
be readily implemented in practice. The actual holding cost associated with an admitted or-
der is a complex (random) function that depends in part on the rule used to admit orders to
the system. Thus, we identify approximations for the holding costs involved that are readily
measurable and hence, implementable. We do this in Section 4.1. A desirable feature of our
analysis is that we can develop upper and lower bounds on the expected holding costs and,
hence, can assess the accuracy of these bounds.
4.1 Expected Holding Times
First, we determine an upper bound on the expected amount of time a low-revenue job spends
in the system when there are i and j other high- and low-revenue jobs waiting for processing.
Assume that the high-revenue input queue never empties. Under this assumption, there is
always a probability of (1—^)/// that a low-revenue job is selected for processing. The amount
of time a low-revenue jobs remains in the system is overstated under this assumption. (If the
high-revenue input queue is empty, then, with probability 1, the a low-revenue job is selected
for processing.) Since jobs are processed in a FIFO manner, we want to determine the number
of periods that must elapse before we have exactly j -h 1 low-revenue job completions.
Let A^j+i be a random variable that denotes the number of decision periods that elapse
before a job that is admitted when there are j jobs already in the low-revenue input queue.
Decision periods are independent exponential random variables with mean 1/A. In light
of the discussion above, Nj+i is a negative binomial random variable with parameters [j -\-
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1,(1 -I3)fi/A), so that
for m > j + 1. Therefore,
A
A + /?/^
A
m—j — l
FIN l-lL+ilA
Let Hj be a random variable that denotes the holding time (the total time spent in
the system) of our new arrival. Under the assumption that the high-revenue queue never
empties, Hj is an upper bound on the actual time this job remains is the system. Using
Wald's equation, an upper bound on the expected amount of time until our new arrival
leaves the processing station is
E[7,]=£liV,.,]/A = Ji^.
We obtain a lower bound on the expected holding time, denoted by ILj+i, by assuming
that every job completion corresponds to the completion of a low-revenue job. Under this
assumption, the parameters of Nj+i are {j -\- 1,/z/A), so that
E[^,+J = (j + 1)//..
In the remainder of this section, it will be convenient to refer to the number of periods
remaining in the budget period rather than the number of the period. If the period number
is i, then n = N{\^ ft) — t -\- I denotes the number of periods remaining (including period t).
4.2 Direct Costing Admittance Rules
In our stochastic environment, a direct costing rule admits a job if its revenue exceeds the
expected holding cost generated by that job. (Recall that revenue is defined net of variable
costs and hence is equivalent to the contribution margin.)
If the state of the process is (z, j, r^, tq) at the beginning of period t, we do not know for
certain how many jobs will be processed over the remaining n periods, where n = N{X, fi)—t-\-
L Furthermore, we do not know for certain how many low-revenue jobs will be processed. In
addition, revenue is not received until after the processing of a job is complete. The direct
costing admittance rule we develop in this section determines the difference between the
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expected revenue (with respect to the probability that the job is completed) and the expected
holding costs (with respect to both the probability that low-revenue jobs are processed
and the probability that the processing is completed before the end of the budget period).
Note that with inclusion of holding costs in the formulation, capacity considerations may
force management to reject (under direct costing) an arriving product order with a positive
contribution margin. Thus, management is concerned with satisfaction of both the costing
admittance rule and capacity constraints.
Suppose that the first parameter of A^j+i is j -}- 1. If A^j+i = m, the average time spent
in the system by our new arrival (and hence its expected holding cost) is m/A. Therefore,
the expected contribution margin net of holding costs is tq — m/A. The probability that this
contribution is earned is P {A^j+i ^ n}, when there are n periods remaining in the budget
period. If A^j+i > n, tq is not received and the expected holding cost is n/A. Therefore, the
expected contribution margin of the new arrival whose revenue is rg, if it is admitted and if
we use the lower bound estimate for the holding costs, is
D{n,j,ra) = ^ (r, -m/A)P{yV,+i =m}+ J^ -{n/A)P{N,+, = m}
m=j4
n
= E
m=j+ l
The Direct Cost Admittance Rule is
7n= + l 77i=n+l
1 r / \ T
?{N,^,=m}-^. (8)
n — m
A
Admit a low-revenue job if, and only if, D{n,j,ro) > 0, i + j -|- 1 < n, and
j -\- I < J- Admit a high-revenue job if, and only if, D{n,i^ri) > 0, z + 1 < n,
and i -{- I < I.
Since we are using the lower bound on the holding costs, we know that this version of the
direct costing rule cannot under-admit arrivals relative to the optimal admittance policy.
This is intuitively appealing since direct costing makes no allowances for the opportunity cost
and hence tends to over-admit (and thus overly congest) the production system as suggested
by Devine. Note, however, that at this stage, the fact that direct costing admittance rules
may not be optimal in no way establishes the relative desirability of absorption costing rules.
Appraisal of relative desirability can only justifiably be made with reference to the optimal
adm.ittance policy.
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4.3 Absorption Costing Admittance Rules
The admittance rules under absorption costing are similar to those under direct costing.
However, an additional cost is considered, which may proxy the opportunity costs of con-
gestion that are computed exactly in the MDP. Let A'(^) denote the (fixed) capital cost
associated with the provision of the (manufacturing) server that operates at rate fi units per
unit time during the current budget period. Each unit processed during the budget period
is allocated a share of this sunk cost equal to A' (//)///.
As before, suppose that the state of the decision process is (i,i,rs,ra) and n periods
remain in the budget period. Let
A(n,z,ra) = Y^
r^, ^ I ,
n — m
Ta - A(/X)//X +
m=i+l
The Absorption Cost Admittance Rule is:
A
P{N.^, =m}-^. (9)
Admit a low-revenue order if, and only if, A{n,j,ro) > 0,i -\- j + I < n, and
j -\- I < J- Admit a high-revenue order if, and only if, A{n, i,ri) > 0,i + I < n,
and i
-f 1 < /.
We will now illustrate the application of these costing rules in the stochastic production
environment.
4.4 Numerical Example Revisited
We adopt the same parameter values given in Table 1 and additionally assume that the
sunk cost is 2 cost units (i.e., K{n) = 2). The admittance policy for the MDP is clearly
unchanged. The form of the AC and DC rules are similar to the MDP rule: for each n, z,
and Ts value, each rule admits a low-reward order if, only if, the number of low-reward jobs
awaiting processing is smaller than some critical number. The critical numbers defining the
AC and DC admittance rules are denoted as j'^q and j^q, respectively. The two rules for the
accounting-based costing procedures are given in Tables 4 and 5 when i = and r^ = 0.3.
Place Table 4 here.
Place Table 5 here.
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Comparing the policies in Tables 4 and 5 with the optimal policy in Table 3, we see
that direct costing over-admits low-revenue arrivals in every period except the last period.
In contrast, absorption costing only over-admits in periods t = 31,32,33,38 and 39, but
under-admits in periods t = 1,2,3,4 and 5.
In order to appraise whether the absorption costing policies mix of over- and under-
admittance in the nine periods is preferable to direct costing's over-admittance in forty of
the forty-one periods, we determine the expected payoffs a,t t = I for the two policies.
Assume that at the beginning of period 1 the buffers are empty. Then
pK(0,0,0,2)-h(l-p)Vl(0,0,0,l)
is a measure of the expected total profit that is generated from the start of the budget period
before there are any arrivals. In Table 6, we give this value for each of the three admittance
policies.
Place Table 6 here.
The desirability of absorption costing procedures arises because the allocated cost of
K{fj.)/ fi = 0.0952381 acts as a proxy for the opportunity cost of admitting a low-revenue
job. It is, however, clear that if the sunk cost was larger, say Ki/J.) = 3.5, that this proxy
would change. Recalculating the absorption costing admittance policy with all parameters as
before except for A'(//) = 3.5 results in absorption costing admitting less jobs into the system
because the proxy for opportunity cost now rises to K{fj,)/fi = 0.1666667. The resultant
affect on the AC payoff is that now pVi(0, 0,0,2) + (1 - p)Vi(0, 0, 0, 1) = 0.375. This is
less than the payoff obtainable under direct costing. Hence, in general, once the sunk cost
becomes sufficiently large, direct costing dominates absorption costing. This arises because
the over admittance with direct costing is preferable to the increased under admittance with
absorption costing.
We have apparently reached an impasse in our attempt to establish the relative desir-
ability of one costing procedure over the other. The example given above illustrates that in
general there is no clear dominance. Any differential performance depends on the relative
size of the sunk cost allocation. In the next section, we resolve this problem by establishing
a bound on the size of the sunk cost that ensures that absorption costing always dominates
direct costing.
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5 An "Open Admittance" Condition for the Domi-
nance of Absorption Costing
In this section we focus on tlie admittance of low-revenue orders. If we use the lower bound
on the expected time a low-revenue job remains in the system, we know that the DC rule may
over-admit but can never under-admit relative to the optimal MDP-based rule. Furthermore,
by the nature of the rules, the AC rule may under-admit, but can never over-admit relative
to the DC rule. The AC rule can also under- or over-admit relative to the MDP rule. The
condition developed in this section ensures that the AC rule used in a given time period does
not under-admit relative to the MDP rule. This condition, in conjunction with the fact that
we are using the lower bounds on the expected holding costs, guarantees that an admittance
policy based upon absorption costing generates strictly higher expected profits than a policy
based upon direct costing. The intuition for this result is very straightforward. We know
that the AC rule never under-admits relative to the DC rule. If, in addition, AC does not
under-admit relative to the MDP, then the AC admittance policy must always over-admit
less frequently than the DC rule, unless the admittance policies are identical. A graphical
representation in Figure 1 makes the point simply.
Place Figure 1 here.
Although the intuition given above is straightforward, the derivation of implementable
sufficient conditions is not. The original justification for looking at heuristic cost accounting
policies was driven by the difficulty in computing the optimal MDP admittance policy.
Hence, Jmdp is not observable and hence cannot form part of the implementable sufficient
conditions. In what follows, we show how we can develop sufficient conditions in which we
replace the unobservable Jmdp with J, the observable maximum buffer size. We can validly
do this provided a fairly mild regularity condition (Assumption 1 below) holds.
To simphfy the notation in this subsection, let j* = j^DP denote the optimal admittance
rule. This rule depends on n, the number of periods remaining in the budget period, i,
the number of high-revenue jobs in the system, and r^, the revenue of the job currently in
service. Since these variables remain fixed throughout our discussion in this section, we do
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not explicitly show this dependence. From (8) and (9), we see that
^ m=j+ l
Therefore, if
Z)(n,i- + l,ro)>^ Y, P{Nj.+2=m}, (10)
for some n, it follows that
A*^ m=j'+2
A(n,;- + l,ro)>0. (11)
The relationship in (11) has the following interpretation: The AC rule will admit a low-
revenue job (if there is room), but it is not optimal to do so (i.e., it over-admits relative to
the MDP). (By construction, if there are already j* + 1 low-revenue jobs in the system, the
MDP rule will not admit any more.) Rewriting (10) yields,
E/ n — m A'(//)\^,., , n['" +— fj P(^^- = ""J > A- (12)
Unfortunately, (12) depends upon j*, a quantity that is not observable. We can establish a
condition that does not depend upon j' by assuming that the following condition holds:
Assumption 1. For some n < N{\,pL),
n
Y,m^{Nj=m} (13)
is increasing in j.
This assumption is fairly weak. Note, for example, that if n is large, (13) is close to {j + 1)/A,
the mean of A^j+i, which is increasing in j. Roughly speaking, the condition requires that
n, the number of decision periods remaining in the budget period, must be large relative
to j, the number of low-revenue jobs in the system that must be processed. We can show
that if (13), the partial expectation of the number of periods that a low-revenue job is in the
system, is increasing in j for some n = n', then it is increasing in j for all n > n' . It is also
straightforward to show that Assumption 1 implies that
E(^)pw = -}<E(^)p(^^ = -}- (1^)
m=j ^ ' m=J
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for j < J and n > J, where J is the maximum number of low-revenue jobs that can be in
the queue.
We now use Assumption 1 and its consequences to simplify the inequality given in (12).
The left-side of (12) can be written as
> [ro-
= E(^o-^ +^)pW = W. (15)
The first inequality follows from Assumption 1. The second inequality follows from the
observation that P{Nj*+2 ^ n} > P{Nj < n}. (The left-side of the inequality is the
probability that j' + 2 low-revenue jobs can be completed in n or fewer periods, while the
right-side is the probability that J > j' -\- 2 jobs can be completed in n or fewer periods.)
We have thus derived a relationship dealing only with the parameters of the problem
that guarantees that (10) holds:
Open Admittance Condition
E/ n — m A'(u)\^,., ^ Ti , ^^__\^o+—^ 'f)?{N, = m}>-. (16)
We call (16) the "Open Admittance" Condition for the following reason: if (16) holds, the
AC rule will always admit any arriving order, regardless of its revenue class, if there is room
in the appropriate input buffer for that job. To see this, note that (16) can be written as
A(n, J, To) > 0. Indirectly, we have shown that if A{n,j + l,ro) > 0, then A{n,j,ro) > for
< i < J — I. Therefore, the AC rule will admit a low-reward job no matter how many
low-reward jobs are awaiting processing. Furthermore, if the rule always admits low-revenue
orders, it will also admit any high-revenue order, if there is room in the input buffer. (To
see that (16) implies (10) and, therefore, (11) are true, note that the left-side of (16) is no
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larger than the left-side of (12), so that if (16) is true, (12), and hence (10), also hold.) The
condition in (16) depends only on observable parameters of the problem and is therefore
readily computable.
The intuition behind this condition is as follows. For absorption costing to dominate
direct costing, we require that the AC rule admit less low-revenue orders than the DC rule
and that the AC rule admit a low-revenue order in any situation when the optimal rule
does so. That is, we require that the AC rule's proxy for opportunity cost be positive, but
underestimate the true opportunity cost implicitly used in the MDP. This is what equation
(12) formalizes. Note that the requirement that the AC rule never under-admit relative
to the optimal admittance policy alleviates the need to compare the losses due to under-
admittance with those resulting from over-admittance. The monotonicity requirement given
in Assumption 1 allows us to replace the unobservable j* with J in equation (12), so that
the condition is expressed solely in terms of variables that are observable.
The expression given in (16) places restrictions on the relationship between the maximum
number of low-revenue jobs that are permitted in the system and the number of time periods
that are available for the processing of those jobs. Roughly speaking, the condition states
that if the design capacity of the system, measured in terms of the size of the input buffer J,
is small relative to the number of decision periods remaining in the planning horizon, then
absorption costing results in an admittance policy that is closer to the optimal policy than
is the direct costing rule. Thus, (16) also formalizes the notion that absorption costing is
desirable if allocated costs are not too "too high"
.
We summarize the primary result developed in this section:
If the Open Admittance Condition (16) holds, the admittance of low-revenue
orders based on absorption costing yields higher expected profits than a rule
based on direct costing for all in-process inventory levels.
5.1 Another Numerical Example
The parameters for the example in this section are: A = 30, // = 31, / = J = 7, tq = 0.3,
n = 0.4, /? = 0.5, a = 0.2, p = 0.2, and K{fi) = 2. When n = 41, Condition 1 and (16) both
hold. Therefore, we know that the admittance rule based upon absorption costing dominates
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the rule based upon direct costing in the first period of the decision process. Indeed, in the
258 (8x8x2x2 + 2) possible states of the process in the first period, the direct costing
rule over-admits 76 orders, while the absorption costing rule only over-admits 44 orders.
As expected, neither rule ever under-admits an order. Furthermore, the expected profit
generated by the absorption costing rule is higher in every state than the profit generated
by the direct costing rule. The three admittance policies when 2 = and r^ = 0.4 are given
in Table 7. The expected payoffs in the initial state are given in Table 8.
Place Table 7 here.
Place Table 8 here.
5.2 Empirical Implications
A number of studies have documented the differential use of either absorption or direct cost-
ing practices. For instance, Fremgen and Liao (1981) report that 84% of surveyed companies
in the U.S. used absorption costing. Similarly, Atkinson (1987) reports the figure to be 70%
for Canadian data. Given this divergence of use, we suggest that empirically-testable hy-
potheses can be developed from our theory that could explain why some firms use absorption
costing while other use direct costing.
It is important to note at this stage that our theory of cost allocation refers to the sunk
costs of providing capacity. There are other types of allocated sunk cost, such as corporate
headquarter's costs, which are not covered by our theory. A rationale for allocating these
other costs may well exist but may be of a different nature. Atkinson (1987, p. 55) argues
that besides ". . . demand for cost allocations ... for the purpose of coordinating the decision
making . . ." as in our theory, there is also ". . . other demands for cost allocations which
reflect other objectives to be served by cost allocation (particularly the fairness perspective
that is prevalent in the regulation, social psychology, taxation, and game theory literatures)."
Thus, a general theory of cost allocation would permit different categories of costs that may
be allocated for contrasting reasons. An empirical test should clearly differentiate between
different categories of cost allocation.
The development of empirical tests of our theory must focus on the allocation of sunk
capacity costs and not other sunk costs. The satisfaction of our open admittance condition
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implies that a manufacturer chooses to admit all arriving orders so that input buffers remain
full. One could empirically test to see if the open admittance condition is satisfied by
observing a manufacturer's admittance policy. If the manufacturer chooses to fill buffers
to capacity, then our theory suggests that this firm is using an admittance rule that is
consistent with absorption costing. An alternative to this micro-level analysis of individual
manufacturers is to determine those industries that operate at nearly full capacity and test
for the usage of absorption costing.
6 Conclusion
There has been considerable debate over whether absorption costing or alternatively direct
costing procedures should be used to appraise product order acceptance decisions. The
traditional defense of absorption costing is based on its ability to proxy hard to observe
opportunity costs. We have established that this argument should not be proposed unless
one can demonstrate that the absorption cost based proxies for opportunity costs are indeed
"good". We illustrated that in some circumstances absorption costing so overestimates
opportunity costs that direct costing is preferable.
We presented a Markov decision process that determines opportunity costs exactly. Since
such procedures are difficult to apply in practice, we investigated the extent to which absorp-
tion costs are good proxies for opportunity costs. In doing so, we presented one explanation
for why the debate over absorption versus direct costing is controversial: in general, neither
admittance rule uniformly dominates the other in a stochastic setting.
Further, we contributed to the debate by developing an "open admittance" condition
that ensures that an absorption costing admittance rule always generates higher expected
profits than does a direct costing rule. Hence, we provided a formal defense of absorption
costing procedures when the sufficient conditions we characterize are met. These conditions
are couched exclusively in terms of observable variables and hence can be applied in practice.
Finally, we briefly discussed the empirical implications of our analysis.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 20 ^1 0.3
fJ' 21 (3 0.5
I and J 7 a 0.0008
ro 0.25 P 0.5
Table 1: Parameters values for the numerical example.
ihj.rs) Ui{i,j,r,) Opportunity Cost
(0,0,2) 0.53
(0,1,2) 0.82 0.29
(0,2,2) 0.97 0.15
(0,3,2) 1.02 0.05
(0,4,2) 1.03 0.01
(0,5,2) 0.98 -0.05
(0,6,2) 0.88 -0.10
(0,7,2) 0.74 -0.14
Table 2: Optimal expected payoffs when ^ = 1.
Time Period t iMDP
1 - 5 4
6-30 3
31 - 37 2
38 - 40 1
41 (final period)
Table 3: The optimal admittance policy when i = and r^ = 0.3.
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Time Period t Jdc
1 - 27 5
28 - 33 4
34 - 37 3
38 - 39 2
40 1
41
Table 4: Direct costing admittance rule when i = and r^ = 0.3.
Time Period t J'ac
1 - 33 3
34 - 39 2
40 1
41
Table 5: Absorption costing admittance rule when i = and r^ = 0.3.
Rule K(0,0,0,2) V^i(0,0,0,l) pVi(0,0,0,2) + (l -p)Vi(0. 0,0,1)
MDP
DC
AC
0.5283
0.4900
0.5277
0.4783
0.4400
0.4777
0.5033
0.4650
0.5027
Table 6: Expected profit by admittance rule.
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Time Period t ioc Jlc ^MDP
1 - 27 6 6 5
28 - 42 6 6 4
43 - 47 6 5 3
48 5 5 3
49 - 50 5 4 3
51 - 52 4 4 2
53 4 3 2
54 - 55 3 3 2
56 3 2 1
57 - 58 2 2 1
59 1 1
60 - 61
Table 7: The three admittance rules when ^ = and r. = 0.4.
Rule pK(0,0,0,2) + (l-p)Vi(0,0,0,l)
MDP
DC
AC
0.92348
0.89808
0.90276
Table 8: Expected profit by admittance rule.
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i + 4
i + 3
i + 1
J
Region in which j'^q must
lie if sufficient conditions
are satisfied
Jdc
Jmdp
Figure 1: Comparison of Admittance Rules
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